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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This year marks the entry into force of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods.1 The Convention is the fruit of a prolonged and
arduous work as it had to be created out of a compromise of
divergent factors like the Common and Civil law traditions,
the non-market Socialist and the free-market economies, the
industrially developed and the developing countries and the
existing regime of the Uniform Law for International Sales2
and the provisions of the Convention itself. However, The
Convention's entry into force is only a step towards its
gaining worldwide acceptance.3 Its purpose of being a
uniform law for a larger international community will depend
on how many countries of the world choose to become parties
to it.
While the Convention gains momentum, two uniform laws
continue to function efficiently on a regional basis. For
over twenty years, the Uniform Commercial Code has been
providihg the basis for the commercial law of all the U.S.
states except for Louisiana. It has also been enacted in the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. The other
1
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uniform law is the General Conditions of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance,4 which for nearly thirty years
has been governing the trade among a overwhelming majority
of the Socialist countries. In contrast to the proposed goal
of the Convention to become the law for a large number of
countries without regard to their political, economic and
legal systems, the two latter laws regulate the trade among
groups of entities having the same pOlitical, economic and
legal systems, which is one of the factors contributing to
their effective functioning. Nevertheless, the experiences
of the two latter uniform laws justify their comparison with
the Convention for determining firstly, to what extent the
latter follows the methods and principles of unification of
either one of them, and secondly, how far compatible are the
provisions of either one of them with those of the
Convention. Apart from the value of such a comparison from
an academic point of view, the need for such a study for the
benefit of the international traders or practitioners of
international trade law cannot be overemphasized.
This thesis attempts to examine and compare an
important component of any law of contract for the sale of
goods, namely, the remedies available to an aggrieved party
following a breach of contract. The comparison is made
between the two regional uniform laws and is based on the
factors like the legal traditions, legal principles and the
peculiar characteristics of the socio-economic systems which
3
explain the difference between the laws governing identical
subject-matters. The relevant provision of the Convention is
then compared against those of the above two.
The first part of the thesis deals with the historical
background of the uniform laws, their scope and specific
characteristics. The relationship between the national laws
and the Convention and the effect of the United States'
ratification of the UN Sales Convention are also discussed
in this chapter.
The following chapters examine the status, role and
significance of the two major remedies - the damages and
specific performance, in the major legal systems and the
uniform laws. A comparison of the remaining remedial
provisions is made in the following chapter which precedes
the conclusion that, although the major legal systems of the
world have a converging tendency as far as the basic
remedies for breach are concerned, the difference in the
socio-economic systems stands out as the most formidable
obstacle in the attempts to formulate a set of universally
acceptable uniform rules for regulating the international
sale of goods.
4
1. The United Nations Convention for the International Sale
of Goods 1980, (hereinafter the Convention): The UN
certified English text of the Convention along with the
U.S. Department of State Notice of U.S. Ratification of
the Convention appears in 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6262 (March 2,1987) .
2. The Uniform Law for International Sale was drafted by the
International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) and adopted by a conference convened by
the Netherlands in 1964. However, only 8 countries became
party to it.
3. The Convention needed only 12 ratification or accessions
to it for its entry into force; see supra note 1,
Art.99(1). Its success, however, will depend on whether
or not it will gain the acceptance of a much larger
number of nations.
4. The General Conditions of the CMEA 1968/75 in the Wording
of 1979. An English translation of this document is
appended to T. Hoya, East-West Trade: Comecon Laws:
American-Soviet Trade (1984).
CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION, SCOPE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE UNIFORM LAWS
A. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1. BACKGROUND
In the United States, most commercial activities are
regulated not by Federal1 law but by state laws. Therefore,
in principle, all states of the nation have the prerogative
of regulating commercial activities within their territories
in an individual manner and irrespective of how the same
matters are regulated elsewhere within the country. Given
the reality of nationwide commercial activities, different
individual state laws regulating the same subject-matter can
hamper the commerce of the nation as a whole. This obvious
disadvantage of the non-uniformity of the laws was felt as
early as 1890 when efforts were first made to bring about a
uniformity in the state laws dealing with commercial
transactions.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, consisting of representatives from seven states2
met for the first time in 1892 and immediately identified
5
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the laws concerning the negotiable instruments as the most
worthy of being the subject of unification.3 In 1896, they
approved the final draft of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, which was enacted by all the states,
territories and insular possessions of the United States.4
From 1906 to 1910, Professor Samuel Williston prepared
four more drafts at the initiative of the Commissioners.
These were drafts for the Uniform Law of Sales, Warehouse
Receipts, Bills of Lading and Stock Transfers.5 These laws
received recognition of a large number of U.S. jurisdictions
and continued to be in force till about the middle of the
twentieth century, when the Conference of Commissioners
expressed the desirability of doing away with the piece-meal
regulation of commercial transactions, as the substantial
change in the latter had rendered such regulation
inadequate.
William A. Schnader, the President of the Conference
suggested at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Conference in
1940 that, ·instead of carrying out a revision of the
existing laws individually, attempts should be made to
create an up-to-date uniform law encompassing regulation of
all aspects of commercial transactions.6 He visualized this
law to be the uniform law of all the jurisdictions of the
United States, which would come into force as a result of a
minimum number of legislative Acts as opposed to the
hundreds that would be necessary should different aspects of
7
commercial transactions be-regulated through separate Acts.7
Professor Karl N. LLewellyn, who chaired the Uniform
Commercial Acts Section of the Conference, presented to the
same meeting a revised Uniform Sales Act intended to be
enacted either as a single instrument or as a part of a
broader Uniform Commercial Code.8 The Executive Committee of
the Conference approved the preparation of a Commercial Code
as soon as sufficient fund for the project was available.9
Since the American Law Institute was also engaged in
preparing a restatement of the similar laws at that time, it
was decided that the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code
should be carried out jointly with that organization.10
The World War II and the lack of adequate funds forced
postponement of work on the Uniform Code till 1945 when
serious work was undertaken by-the Conference and ALl with
the aim of completing the project within the next five
years.11 Professors Karl Llewellyn and Soya Mentschikoff
served as the Chief and Associate Chief Reporters of the
project.12
Intensive work of the drafters resulted in the
completion of the draft and its approval by the Conference,
ALl and the American Bar Association House of Delegation in
1951.13 In the period following this approval, the
Conference and ALl considered the options of either
presenting the draft to the Congress as the basis for
enactment of a Federal law, persuading the states to
8
conclude an interstate compact with regard to the adoption
of the Code, or presenting the draft for the consideration
of the state legislatures. Since the Congress is empowered
by the Constitution to regulate only interstate commerce,14
the Code encompassing varied areas of commerce was not
deemed suitable for a Federal legislation. Moreover, the
Commissioners representing the states and mandated to
facilitate adoption of uniform state laws preferred to
present the Code to the state legislatures' consideration.
An interstate compact was not found advantageous over this
alternative. 15
Pursuant to the decision of the Commissioners to
present the draft Code for the consideration of the state
legislatures, the Code was introduced in the legislatures of
California, Mississippi and New York in 1952.16 The draft
Code was reintroduced in the California and Mississippi
legislatures in 1953. The legislatures of Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania also reviewed the draft Code the same year.17
At the same time discussion in scholarly journals propagated
for and against the adoption of the Code.18
In accordance with the objections and suggestions that
were made in connection with the Code's adoption, some
amendments were made to it and the revised Code was
published in two volumes in 1957.19 In course of the next
ten years, the Code was reviewed and adopted by 48 States,
9the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.20 Today,
Louisiana remains the only state which has not enacted the
Code as a whole.21 The Uniform Commercial Code is
periodically revised by a Permanent Editorial Board. The
most recent addition to the Code was made in 1986, whereby a
provision was made for the uniform regulation of leases.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UCC AND FEATURES
DISTINGUISHING IT FROM THE OTHER UNIFORM LAWS
The Uniform Commercial Code is not a law by itself. It
is only a model law upon which states may base their own
commercial laws - deviating from its position whenever and
wherever deemed necessary in view of overriding state
interests. As early as 1967, therefore, 775 separate
amendments were made to the Code by the jurisdictions
enacting it.22 Apart from the variations initiated by the
individual legislatures, there remains another reason for
the non-uniformity. The Code on occasions provides optional
provisions.23 Thus there may be occasions when different
states may have different provisions while they are actually
adhering to the UCC specimen provisions. Moreover, the so
called "open-ended" drafting of the Code also on occasions
gives rise to different interpretation and, therefore,
precedents, in different jurisdictions.24
The UCC is a model uniform law for jurisdictions of
the Common Law. Therefore, the general appearance of the.
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the Code has deviated from the Common Law to establish a
UCC is not a restatement of the Common Law. In certain cases
open to changes in customs and
usages in trade. Article 1 of the
Code (General Definitions
and Principles of Interpretation) provides that usages of
trade supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.27
Furthermore, the Code states that one of its underly~ng
pUl:poses and policies is to permit continued expansion of
cont.l:act.sr u:pon ac"c.\lal, ~'tovable C1.:r.C\lW.~ta:t\.c~~,'ta.t~~!t~o.~
upon a metaphysical concept of elastic
and endlessly fluid
dimensions.,,26 The Code is
commercial practices through customs, usage and agreement of
the parties.28 The Code's preference of its users customs
and usages over the abstract principles of laws makes it a
law for merchants as opposed to one for the lawyers.29
Code reflect its affinity with that system of law. Professor
the continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and
non-Code law on which it rests for support.,,25 However, the
respect that the UCC "derives from Common law" and "assumes
Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of the Code, said in this
pragmatic and effective provision. Illustrative of this is
the Code's underscoring the importance of demonstrable
bre£ched contract. This ensures "•..that disputes, as they
arise, can focus, as does all of the modern law of
ascertaining the rights and remedies of the parties to a
factors like custody and control rather than "title" for
11
Most of the UCC provisions are specimen for non-
mandatory rules. Parties are free to either derogate from
the rules enacted on their basis, or displace such rules
altogether as the UCC recognizes freedom of contract as a
basic principle.3D
The UCC is, as described above, a model law which is
directed at the unification of laws of the Common Law
jurisdictions. In addition, a third specific characteristic
of the UCC that distinguishes it from the other uniform laws
of sales, viz., the CMEA General Conditions of Delivery of
Goods31 and the UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods,32 is that its purpose is to
unify laws of entities of a Federal state, rather than
different sovereign states. One striking similarity,
however, among all the three uniform laws is that there is
no supreme arbiter or interpreter of any of these laws. The
problems arising out of this feature in respect of the UCC
has already been indicated.33 Those concerning the other
uniform laws are discussed in the corresponding sections of
this chapter.
B. THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE
The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are the earliest
uniform laws for the inter~ational sale of goods. Their
12
adoption in 1958 was seen as "a new and important
development in international economic law, a development
which presents an unmistakable challenge to Western jurists
and traders.,,34 For nearly thirty years now the General
Conditions have been successfully regulating trade among the
Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA). This success is due largely to the fact
that the CMEA Member Countries have identical socio-economic
systems which in turn insures the similarity in legal
principles in these countries. An overview of the Socialist
laws and its correlation with the larger Civil Law family in
the fOllowing section indicates the importance of this
factor for the successful functioning of the General
Conditions.
1. THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM
An overwhelming majority35 of the Socialist countries
of Eastern Europe continue to follow the Romanist tradition
in the law of contracts, modified wherever necessary due to
exigencies of the Socialist system.36 The formal appearance
of such laws does not show th€ change in their contents that
the Socialist jurists vigorously claim to have been brought
about, thus giving the Socialist laws an entirely different
status, distinguishable from any of the traditional
systems.37 However, be it due to the Romanist tradition or
the actual nature of Socialism, the emphasis on specific
13
performance as a primary remedy in sales contracts in the
laws of the Socialist countries is quite clear. In the
Soviet Union, for instance, the law of contract "is based on
the prerequisite that a contract concluded by parties must
be performed by them." 38 To this end the Soviet civil
legislation "create(s) the principle of real performance of
a contract-the obligation to perform a contract actually.,,39
There have been disagreements within the Socialist
system as to whether the means of production in the
Socialist economies gave birth to a new type of contracts -
the "economic contracts" concluded between the Socialist
enterprises.40 The division of contracts into "economic" and
"civil" ones, to be regulated respectively by "civil" and
"economic" laws did not make a foothold either in the USSR
or other Socialist countries except Czechoslovakia and
GDR.41 The fact that the Socialist system barely tolerates
private property42 at all rules out the possibility of a
large-scale "civil" contract-making. The contracts that are
entered into, therefore, are essentially what would have
been classified as "economic contracts". Specific
performance of such contracts are a presupposed obligation
of parties43 and normally compensation of damages and
paYment of penalties will not relieve a party from actual
performance. 44
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2. BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL CONDITIONS
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, more
.commonly known in the west by its acronYm CMEA (or COMECON),
was founded in 1946 by six Socialist countries of Western
Europe in response to the Marshall Plan then being
implemented in Western Europe.45 Today CMEA comprises of ten
active Member Countries from three continents.46
To facilitate bilateral trade among themselves, the
European Socialist countries formulated General Conditions-
bodies of permissive rules, providing for a framework within
which the foreign trade organizations of these countries
were to conduct trade with their counterparts.47
The history of the General Conditions within the
framework of the CMEA dates back to 1951 when the General
Conditions of Commerce of the CMEA were adopted.48 These
were model or specimen rules designed to provide guidance
for bilateral trade between the Member Countries of the
CMEA.49
The first version of the General Conditions that are
now in force today was adopted in 1958.50 These General
Conditions focused mainly on the machine-building industry
and generally underscored the notion that the law must
"exert all its power for the performance of the contract and
avoidance and cancellation of the contract should be
severely restricted even in the event of a breach.,,51 The
discussion of remedies for breach of contract in relation to
16
Foreign Trade of CMEA decided in 1962 to revise the 1958
version of the General Conditions.54
A working group of legal experts from the CMEA Member
Countries produced a revised version of the General
Conditions55 after six years of work in 1968, which after
having been approved by the Standing Committee, entered into
force on January 1, 1969.56
The 1968 version of the General Conditions was further
modified and amended in 1975 and this later version came
into force in 1976. Some amendments to this version were
approved in 1978 and the amended version entered into force
on January 1, 1979. This version, currently in force, is
referred to as "The General Conditions of 1968/75 in the
Wording of 1979.,,57
3. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE GENERAL CONDITIONS
The General Conditions of 1968/75 in the Wording of
1979 are arranged in 110 Articles in 17 chapters dealing
with a wide variety of topics like the conclusion,
modification and termination of contracts,58 basis and dates
of delivery,59 quality and quantity of the goods,60 packing
and marking,61 general provisions of liability,62 claims for
quality and quantity,63 and sanctions64 etc.
Despite their name, the General Conditions have the
force of law as distinguished firstly from the early General
Conditions of bilateral trade among the European Socialist
17
countries from which the former evolved and to which they
owe their name, and secondly, from the General Conditions
formulated by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE)65 which are purely model rules. The General
Conditions, from the international legal point of view,
represent a multilateral Treaty. From the point of view of
the national laws, they are substantive and procedural rules
unified through an international agreement.66 The General
Conditions received the force of national law through acts
of the active Member Countries of the CMEA.67
The General Conditions govern the foreign trade in
goods of the CMEA Member Countries. Whether or not referred
to in the contract, or in any other way adopted by the
parties, the General Conditions apply to all contracts
concerning such foreign trade.6a The General Conditions
contain both imperative and permissive norms69 and for
situations when a matter is not found to be regulated, they
refer to the substantive provisions of the civil law of the
seller's country.70 Departure from the General Conditions is
severely restricted. Only in the "cases when the parties in
making a contract come to the conclusion that because of the
specific nature of the goods and/or peculiarities of their
delivery, a departure from individual provisions of the
General Conditions is required" that the parties are allowed
to make such a departure.71
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The General Conditions are not the only uniform law
for intra-CMEA transactions. In addition to these, there
exist the General Conditions of Instalation, the General
Conditions of Technical Assistance (Customer Service) and
the General Conditions of Specialization and Cooperation in
Production, all of which combine to provide a complex form
of regulation of the many-faceted intra-CMEA transactions.72
Finally, these General Conditions mentioned above are to be
distinguished from e.g., the COMECON-Finnish General
Conditions of 197873 which are recommended for optional use
of the contracting parties in Finland and any CMEA Member
Country. This type of General Conditions lack one vital
characteristic of the former - they do not have the force of
law. The same is true for the general conditions for trade
among the CMEA Member Countries 'and Yugoslavia, which
although a Socialist country, does not belong to the CMEA.
C. THE UNITED NATIONS SALES CONVENTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods was adopted by a Diplomatic
Conference in Vienna in April, 1980. The Convention has come
into force on January 1, 1988.74 The Convention is the
latest effort of the international community to work out a
set of norms to regulate sale of goods among the nations of
the world. The history of the endeavour to establish a
uniform law for sale of goods is a long one which dates back
19
to the past century. A brief account of the events leading
to the Convention precedes the discussion of the Convention
itself in the following sections.
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UN SALES CONVENTION
The history of the unification of private laws
pertaining to the sale of goods dates back to as early as
1893 when a conference in the Hague adopted the Conventions
on Civil Procedure and Personal Status which were later
ratified by most of the European States.75 The next landmark
in the process of unification is the beginning of work by
the International Institute for Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) in this field under the auspices of the League of
Nations in 1930.76 The drafting Committee of UNIDROIT
prepared a preliminary draft of the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (ULIS) in 1935. A revised draft
was prepared by the same Committee in 1939, but further work
had to be sUspended due to the outbreak of World War II.
After the War, in 1951, a conference of 21 nations,
convened by the Netherlands, appointed a Special Committee
to continue working on the revised ULIS draft which it had
approved. The Special Committee completed its own draft in
1956 and this draft, accompanied by a Report was sent by the
Netherlands to other interested governments, inViting their
comments. The Special Committee reviewed and modified the
draft on the basis of the comments received in response.
20
The government of the Netherlands convened a second
conference which was held at the Hague from April 2-25,
1964. This conference approved the ULIS draft and also
reviewed and adopted a companion instrument to ULIS - the
Uniform Law on Formation on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (ULF), work on which had begun in 1936 by a
committee which prepared the draft by correspondence.77
The United States joined the UNIDROIT in 1963, and
participated in the 1964 Hague Conference.78 However, the
United States did not become a party to ULIS which entered
into force among some European and two developing
countries.7.9 This lukewarm response to ULIS prompted the
United Nations' entrusting the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), formed in 1966, with the
task of revising the ULIS so as to insure its wider
acceptability. In 1977, UNCITRAL approved a text of a
convention and added to it provisions on formation of
contracts and interpretation in 1978.80 It was this draft
that was approved by the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna in
the Spring of 1980. The Conference which was participated by
representatives of 67 States and many international
organizations,81 also adopted a Protocol amending the
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International
Sale of Goods, which is annexed to the Final Act of the
Conference as is the Convention itself. This Protocol amends
the provisions of the Convention on the Limitation Period in
21
the International Sale of Goods of 1974 so as to allow
conformity of its provisions with those of the Convention.
2. SCOPE OF THE UN SALES CONVENTION
The Convention becomes applicable to contracts for
sale of goods among parties with a place of business in
different States when either the concerned States are
parties to it, or when the rules of private international
law points to the application of the law of a Contracting
State.82 It follows from this provision that the place of
business of the parties, rather than their nationality, has
to be different (i.e., in different States) for the
Convention to become applicable to a contract between them.
The applicability of the Convention to such contracts
pursuant to this provision is -automatic, i.e., the parties
do not have to acknowledge or mention the Convention's
applicability. However, they may opt to have their contract
wholly or partially outside the ambit of the Convention.83
The Convention limits its applicability firstly, to
"only the formation of the contract of sale and rights and
obligations of the buyer and seller arising from such a
contract.,,84 Except when otherwise expressly provided in the
Convention, "the validity of .the contract or any of its
provisions or of any usage,,85 or "the effect which the
contract may have in the goods sold,,86 will not come under
the purview of the Convention. Moreover, the Convention does
22
not address itself to the situation of injury or death
caused by the goods sold.87
As for the objects of regulation, the Convention does
not concern itself with the contracts for goods bought for
personal, family or household use with some exceptions,88
goods sold at auctions,89 or on execution by authority of
law.90 Also excluded from the scope of the Convention are
sale of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable
instruments or money9l as well as that of ships, vessels,
hovercraft or aircraft92 or electricity.93
According to the Convention, the general principles on
which it is based are to be used for resolving issues
pertaining to matters that are governed by the Convention by
not dealt with explicitely.94 These are the principles of
good faith,95 adherence to the intent of the parties,96
reasonable interpretation of the parties conduct,97 and
practices and usages of the parties.98 In the situation when
such principles are found inadequate, the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law is to be
applied. 99
3. THE CONVENTION AND THE NATIONAL LAWS
As stated above,lOO the Convention becomes
automatically applicable to contracts for sale of goods on
fulfillment of the following conditions:
23
(1) That the parties have places of business in different
States: and,
(2) Such States are parties to the Convention, or also
when
(3) The rules of private international law lead to
application of the law of one such State - party to
the Convention.
On meeting these requirements, the provisions of the
Convention become operative regardless of presence or
absence of rules of national law of the concerned State(s).
The addition of the alternative method of ascertaining
jurisdiction through the rules of private international law
increases the possibility of a greater number of disputes
being directed towards the Contracting States. These
disputes will have to be resolved not by applying the law of
the forum, but by application of the Convention's
substantive provisions. Apart from that, this clause may
result in parties finding themselves in situations which
they did not contemplate. Two parties from two non-
Contracting States may find their contract being governed by
the Convention because of a remote relationship of the
contract to a Contracting State.
To avoid such a situation, the Convention explicitly
allows the Contracting States to make a declaration at the
time of ratification or accession to the effect that they
will not be bound by the provision of Art.1(1)(b) regarding
24
the indication of jurisdiction by the rules of private
international law.lOl The United States chose to make such a
declaration upon depositing the instrument of
ratification.102 This will enable the United States courts
to apply the Uniform Commercial Code instead of the
Convention when there is a considerable linkage of the
contract to the United States and when at least one of the
parties to the contract has his place of business in a non-
Contracting State.
As for the group of States like the CMEA, which
already have rules governing the identical matters dealt
with by the Convention, the latter provides for a
reservation to be made by such States which will insure
operation of the current rules in the tr~de among these
States.I03 However, when the contract is concluded by one
party belonging to this group and another outside this
group, the provisions of the Convention become operative,
provided the other requirements regarding the Convention's
application are met.I04
4. THE EFFECT OF RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION BY THE
UNITED STATES
As stated earlier,lOS for the most part, commerce in
the United States is regulated by the individual states
rather than by Federal law. Thus, the ratification of the
Convention by the United States, which denotes assumption by
25
the Federal government of international responsibility in
respect of sale of goods covered by the Convention, may
appear to challenge the state prerogative of regulating
commerce, derived from the Constitution.
The Convention recognizes the possibility of a discord
between the federal and constituent entities in a federal
system on the assumption of international respopsibility and
provides that in such a situation, a contracting federal
State may specify the area of the application of the
Convention within its territory. lOG The area specified as
one excluded from the Convention's application will be
considered as a non-Contracting State for the purpose of the
Convention when one of the parties has his place of business
in such an area.107 When no such declaration is made, the
Convention is assumed to be applicable in respect of all the
territorial units of the Contracting State. lOB Federal
systems like Canada may find making of such a declaration in
respect of territorial scope of the Convention appropriate.
However, the United States need not make such a declaration
since the Convention concerns international sales, which by
the virtue of the commercel09 and TreatyllO clauses of the
Constitution, are subject matters of Federal regulation. On
this premise, no declaration concerning the limitation of
territorial application of the Convention was made by the
United States upon ratification of the Convention.lll
Therefore, the territorial scope of the Convention extends
to all territories under the jurisdiction of the United
States.
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1. The exception being the interstate commerce which by the
authority of the Constitution, is a sUbject-matter of
Federal regulation. U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, CI.2.
2. The seven states to send Commissioners to the first
Conference in 1892 were Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
3. See, Bane, From Holt to Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn
and Mentschikoff: The Progressive Development of
Commercial Law, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 351, 367 (1983).
4. Id., at 368.
5. Id., at 369 citing Romdegger, UCC-Code of Commerce, Fall1987 Uniform Law Memo 12.
6. See, Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the
National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform StateLaws, 370 (1960).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, An Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
~Va. L. Rev. 28, 29 (1961)~
11. See Bane, supra note 3, at 370.
12. See Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 Yale L.J. 800 (1958).
13. See Bane, supra, note 3, at 371.
14. See supra note 1 on the Commerce Clause.
15. See Bane, supra note 3, at 371.
16. See Braucher, supra note 12, at 800-801.
17. Id.
18. Of the few who fervently called for rejection of the
Code, Professor Frederick K. Beutel was one. See, ~,
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should
Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334 (1952); Beutel, The
Proposed Commercial Code As a Problem in Codification,
16 L. & Contemp. Problems 141-64 (1951). See also
LLewelyn, Why a Commercial Code? 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779·
28
(1953); Mentschikoff, In the Cause of Uniformity, 36
A.B.A.J. 212 (1950), advocating for the Code.
19. See Braucher, supra note 12, at 804.
20. See U.C.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan), State Correlation
Table.
21. However, Louisiana has enacted Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7
and 8 in substance. Id. La 1.
22. See Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1, 10 (1967).
23. The Uniform Commercial Code (Official Text of 1972 as
ammended up to 1986, hereinafter cited as the UCC), § 2-
318 (Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or
Implied), for ~, offers three alternatives, and any
of the United States jurisdictions enacting a law on the
basis of the UCC can adopt anyone of them which gives
rise to the possibility that there may be three
different variants of these regulation in effect at the
same time.
24. ~, the use of phrases like "commercial
reasonableness" or "good faith" in Articles 2 and 9 by
the drafters may lead to interpretation of these phrases
by courts of different jurisdictions in different ways.
See generally, Note, Disparate Judicial Construction of
the Uniform Commercial Code-The Need for Federal
Legislation, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 722 for a narrative of
conflicting interpretation and construction of the same
provision of the Code.
25. Gilmore, Article 9: What it does for the Past?, 26 La.
L. Rev. 285, 285-286 (1966).
26. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the
Sale of Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article 2, 73 Yale L.J. 198, 201-202 (1963).
27. The UCC, supra note 23, § 1-205(3).
28. Id., § 1-102 (2)('b).
29. Comment, Article 2-Sales, Performance, Breach and
Remedies, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 332 (1958).
30. Bunn, Freedom of Contract under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 59 (1960).
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31. The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between the
organizations of the Member Countries of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance 1968/75 in the Wording of
1979 (hereinafter cited as the General Conditions):
English translation of the text is appended to T. Hoya,
East-West Trade: Comecon Law: American Soviet Trade
(1984) (hereinafter cited as Hoya).
32. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 1980 (hereinafter cited as
the Convention). The official text appears in U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18 of April 10, 1980. The UN-certified English
text is contained in the Notice of the Department of
State in 52 Fed. Reg. 40, at 6264-6280 (March 2, 1987).
33. See supra note 24 with accompanying text.
34. Berman, Unification of Contract Clauses in Trade between
Member-Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid,
7 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 659 (1958).
35. The lone outsider to this group is Czechoslovakia which
tried to introduce new forms in the law of contracts,
~, J. Hazard, Communists and Their Laws 311 (1969).
36. Id.
37. See, ~, Tumanov, On Comparing Various Types of Legal
Systems, in Comparative Law 'and Legal Systems:
Historical and Socio-Legal Perspectives 71 (1985).
See also, Szabo, Theoretical Questions of Comparative
Law, in A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law 15-16
(1977).
38. Sadikov, Breach of Contract, USSR Contract Law 68
(Pozdniakov ed., Helsinki 1982).
39. Id.; Art. 168 of the Civil Code of the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic partly states:" An
obligation must be performed in the proper manner and
within the prescribed period of time, in accordance with
the provisions of law, the planning directive or the
contract, or in the absence of such provisions, in
accordance with customary demands." Compare Art. 242 of
the German Civil Code (BGB):"The debtor is bound to
effect the performance according to the requirements of
good faith, ordinary usage being taken into
consideration."
40. See Hazard, supra-note 33, at 313-314.
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41. Id.; See also Eorsi, Contractual Remedies in Socialist
Legal Systems, VII Int'l Encycl. Compo L. 154 (1976).
But cf Ioffe, The Experience of the Soviet Union, VII-5
Int'l Encycl. Compo L.(Contracts in the Socialist
Economy) 18, 27: "The majority of the Soviet scholars
considers the concept (of economic contracts) to be
useful not only as a scientific category but also
practically since very nearly all questions relating to
contractual obligations deriving from contracts embraced
by this concept are resolved very differently from
questions relating to other civil ~aw contracts".
42. ~, the Constitution of the USSR recognizes only two
forms of property:
(1) State property
(2) Property of the collective farms and
cooperatives;
USSR Const. (Fundamental Law), Art. 10.
43. See supra notes 38-39 with accompanying text.
44. Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic, Articles 221 and 191.
45. See Hoya, supra note 31, at 4. See also, the
International Yearbook and Statesmen's Who's Who 1987 at
IV: The press release of the Moscow Conference of the
representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania,
the USSR and Czechoslovakia dated January 25, 1949,
stated that the aim of the establishment of the CMEA was
to promote larger scale economic cooperation between the
Socialist nations on the basis of fair representation.
This was necessitated by the fact that "the governments
of the United States, Britain and several other West
European countries are in fact boycotting trade with the
countries of Peoples' Democracy and the USSR." This is
an allusion to the restrictive terms concerning trade
with the East European countries contained in the
Marshall Plan.
46. Albania and the German Democratic Republic joined the
original six in 1950. Mongolia was admitted in 1962,
Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 1978. Since 1962 ~lbania
does not take part in the operations of the CMEA.
Yugoslavia maintains special contractual links with
the CMEA. The Organization has reached agreements on
cooperation with Finland (1973), Iraq and Mexico
(1975), Nicaragua (1983) and Mozambique (1985).
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47. See I. Szasz, The CMEA Uniform Law for International
Sales 35-36 (1985).
48. An elaborate discussion on this document can be found in
A. Kolenko, Torgoviye Dogovori i Soglaschenia SSSR s
Inostrannimi Gosudarstvami (Commercial Treaties and
Agreements of the USSR with Foreign States) 172-208
(Moscow, 1953).
49. See Szasz, supra note 47 at 5.
50. An English translation of the text of this document can
be found in Berman, supra note 34.
51. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 37.
52. Hoya, supra note 31, at 91.
53. Katona, The International Sale of Goods among Member-
States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 9
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 226, 243-244 (1970).
54. Id., at 244.
55. An English translation of the 1968 version of the
General Conditions can be found in Hoya & Quigley, Jr.,
Comecon 1968 General Conditions of Delivery of Goods, 31
Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1970).
56. All the Member-Countries of the CMEA with the exception
of Czechoslovakia approved the new version already in
1968. Czechoslovakia approved the new version on
January 15, 1969.
57. The text of the General Conditions in Hoya, supra note
31, is accompanied by notes on changes since 1958.
58. The General Conditions, supra note 31, Ch. I.
59. Id. , Chapters II and III.
60. Id. , Chapters IV and V.
61. Id. , Ch. VI.
62. Id. , Ch. XII.
63. Id. , Ch. XIII.
64. Id. , Ch. XIV.
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78. See Farnsworth, supra note 76, at 17.
66. Rosenberg, Obschiye Uslovia Postavok SEV 1968 goda(1968 General Conditions of Delivery of Goods of CMEA),Soviet Y.B. Int'l L. 85, 86 (1969); (summary in English).
67. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 55.
68. See Hoya, supra note 31, at 97.
65. ~, the General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and
Machinery for export (Nos. 188 and 574) and the General
Conditions for the Supply and Erection of Machinery for
Import and Export (nos. 188/a and 574/a); the General
Conditions of Sale for the Import and Export of Durable
Consumer Goods and other Engineering Stock Articles (No.730) etc.
Art. 99(1) of the Convention, supra note 32, states that
the Convention would enter into force on the first day
of the month fOllowing a twelve-month period from the
day of the submission of the 12th instrument ofratification or accession.
69. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 90-91.
70. The General Conditions, supra note 31, Art. 110.
71. Id., Preamble.
72. See Szasz, supra note 47, at 50.
73. The text of this document is appended to Hoya, supranote 31 (appx. II).
74. The United States, Italy and, China deposited the
instrument of ratification of the Convention in
December, 1986, bringing the total number of parties to
the Convention to thirteen. See 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6262(March 2, 1987). ---
75. See Lansing & Hauserman, A comparison of the Uniform
Commercial Code to UNCITRAL's Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C.J. Int'l &Com. Reg. 63, 64 (1980).
76. See Farnsworth, the Vienna Convention: History and
Scope, 18 Int'l. Law. 17 (1984).
77. See Scheffer, Unification of Law Governing the
International Sale of Goods, World Peace Through Law:
The Washington World Conference 283, 286 (1967).
79. Id., at 17-18.
80. Id.
81. See UN Doc. A/CONF.97/18 of April 10, 1980.
82. The Convention, supra note 32, Art.1 (1), (l)(a) and
(l)(b).
83. "The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention, or subject to article 12, derogate from or
vary the effect of any of its provisions." The
Convention, supra note 32, Art.6.
84. The Convention, supra note 32, Art.4.
85. Id. , Art.4(a).
86. Id. , Art. 4 (b) .
87. Id. , Art.5.
88. Id. , Art. 2 (a) .
89. Id. , Art.2(b).
90. Id. , Art. 2 (c) •
91. Id. , Art. 2 (d) .
92. Id. , Art. 2(e) .
93. Id. , Art.2(f).
94. Id., Art.7(2) partially states:"Questions concerning
matters governed by the Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based ..•".
95. Id. , Art.7(1).
96. Id. , Art.8(1).
97. Id. , Art.8(2).
98. Id. , Art.8(3).
99. Id. , Art.7(2).
100. See supra note 82 with accompanying text.
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101. The Convention, supra note 32, Art.95 states that"Any
State may declare at the time of deposit of its
instrument of ratification or accession that it will
not be bound by subparagraph (l)(b) of article 1 ofthis Convention."
102. See U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention
on-Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Official English Text, 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6262 (1987).
103. The Convention, supra note 32, Art. 94(1) provides:
"Two or more Contracting States which has the same or
closely related legal rules on matters governed by
this Convention may at any time declare that the
Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or to
their formation where the parties have their places of
business in those States. Such declarations may be
made jointly or by reciprocal unilateral declarations."
104. See supra note 82 with accompanying text.
105. See supra note 1 with accompanying text.
106. The Convention, supra note 32, Art.93(1) states: "If a
Contracting State has two or more federal units in
which, according to its Constitution, different systems
of law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt
with in this Convention, it may at the time of
signature, ratification,' acceptance, approval or
accession, declare that this Convention is to extend to
all its territorial units or to one or more of them,
and may amend its declaration by sUbmitting anotherdeclaration at any time."
107. Id., Art.93(3).
108. Id., Art.93(4).
109. U.S. Const. Art.I, §8.
110. U.S. Const. Art.II §2; Art.VI.
111. 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6262 (1987); the only declaration that
was made concerned Art.1(1)(b), ~ supra note 102 withaccompanying text.
CHAPTER III
DAMAGES AS REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER
THE UNIFORM LAWS OF SALES
That the function of the law of contract is to specify
which of the agreements are binding and which are not,
define rights and duties of parties under enforceable but
unclear contract terms and indicate the consequences of
unexcused breaches of agreements is a generally agreed
proposition.l These three functions of the contract law can
be assigned to its provisions regarding the formation,
interpretation and remedies fo~ breach respectively.
Remedies thus constitute one of the vital elements of
contract law.
The remedies are called upon to protect one or more of
the fOllowing interests of the parties to a contract:2
(a) the expectation interest, i.e., the claim to
benefit of the transaction itself;
(b) the reliance interest, i.e., the claim to
the reimbursement of losses caused by relying
on the existence of the contract; and
(c) the restitution interest, i.e., the claim to
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restoration of performances made to the other
party.
Various remedies are offered by different legal
systems for protection of such interests. The two most
important among them are money-damages and specific
performance. These remedies however, do not occupy the same
position in the hierarchy of remedies in all the legal
systems. The following section concentrates on damages as a
remedy of breach of contract under the two major legal
systems, i.e., the Common Law and the Civil Law.
A. DAMAGES IN THE COMMON AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
Damages have been traditionally identified as the
preferred remedy in the Common Law. The reason for this is
that in the Common Law system,"the purpose of contract
remedies is not the compulsion of the promisor to perform,
but compensation to the promisee for his loss from the
breach.,,3 The Common Law courts saw their function in
placing the victim of a breach "in the same situation as if
the contract has been performed,,4 rather than decreeing
specific performance by the obligor of his obligations. This
can be accomplished conveniently only through the award of
money-damages. Hence the predominant role of damages in the
Common Law.
Until about the 12th century, however, the Common Law
was not familiar with the money-damages as we know them
tOday.5 The history of damages goes back to the medieval
England, where the common Law COurts were freqUently at odds
with the Courts of Chancery, rUn by the ecclesiastics. The
COurts of Chancery, and later, the COurts of EqUity granted
specific performance for breach of Contract. The Common Law
COurts, on the other hand, designated specific performance
an inferior role, making it available only as an eXCeption_
in cases where the aggrieved party could prove the
inadequateness of moneY-damages for his losses.6 To this
day, specific performance COntinues to PlaYa less
significant role in the Common Law jurisdictions.?
The predominant role of damages in the Common Law has
been defended primarily on the ground of economic
efficiency.S In general terms, when a seller sells goods at
a higher-than-contract price to a person other than the
bUyer despite his contractual Obligations to the latter, and
compensates him for his losses which is less than the actual
selling price of the goods, economic efficiency is said to
have been achieved through the diversion of the goods to a
more valuable Use from a less valuable one _ while both the
original parties profit. The seller profits from the
difference between the actual price and the Contract price
plus the losses of the bUyer under the Contract. The latter
profits from receiVing back the Contract price plus
compensation for the projected profit. Finally, the increase
in the value of goods benefits the SOCiety as a whole.
9
31
38
In the Civil Law, damages are a familiar phenomenon
although the position of this remedy does not correspond to
the predominant role it is accorded in the Common Law. In
the French Law, where a distinction is drawn between an
"agreement by which one or more persons bind themselves
towards one or more persons to give •..,,10 and one binding
such persons "•..to do or not to do something,,,11 damages
are prescribed as a remedy for breach of the latter.12
Moreover, an aggrieved party to the second type of contract
may be authorized to effect the same results as if the
contract is performed at the expense of the obligor.13
Damages are exceptional remedies in the German Law.
Their use is authorized in case of an injury to a person or
damage to a thing,14 or when a ·specific performance is
impossible or inadequate,15 or when the aggrieved party gave
a notice demanding money-damages and fixed a reasonable time
in which the performance might have been rendered.16
Finally, damages are available also when a performance
requires disproportionate expenditure.I? The aggrieved
party's seeking money damages is conditional upon his
formally demanding performance through a notice and in some
cases, the court's appointing a time for performance.18
However, in case of sale of goods, money-damages are awarded
in a large number of cases despite these restrictions.19
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B. DAMAGES IN THE UNIFORM LAWS
1. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Although the Uniform Commercial Code was designed to
bring about a uniformity in the commercial laws of a group
of Common Law jurisdictions, it is not a restatement of the
Common Law. The emphasis laid by its drafters on the
practical aspects like customs and usages of trade on
occasions resulted in innovation and consequently,
deviation, from the Common. law.20 The UCC has thus been
praised for having "the great merit of evincing a thoroughly
practical spirit, a merit that cannot be overrated in a
commercial cOdification.,,21
As concerns damages as a remedy for breach of contract
however, the UCC undoubtedly recognizes its primacy. This is
because damages serve best the UCC drafters' intention to
have the remedial provisions "liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party has fully performed ..•.,,22
The language of this provision makes it sufficiently clear
that the drafters, in agreement with the Common Law
compensatory principle, envisaged a breach being remedied
first and foremost by allowing substitutionary relief - in
money damages. The following enumeration of the occasions
when damages are prescribed by the UCC will further
substantiate this proposition.
40
Section 2-711 of the UCC allows the buyer to cancel
the contract, recover the price where appropriate, make
-"cover" (purchase substitute goods), and recover damages in
addition to these measures in case of a breach of the
seller.23 The damages may be the difference between the
higher purchase price and the lower contract price in case
of a "cover",24 the difference between the higher market
price and the lower contract price in case of non-delivery
of goods or repudiation by the seller,25 the losses
sustained due to the non-conformity of the accepted goods26
or breach of warranty27 and the incidental and consequential
damages as described in § 2-715.28 The aggrieved buyer may,
in applicable cases, deduct all or part of such damages from
the price on notifying the seller of his intention to do
so.29 The buyer also has a right to cure by the seller of
improper tender,30 or, by the construction of § 2-508(2),
accept such a tender with a compensation for the non-
conformity,31 or have the goods substituted.32 In case of
the failure of the seller to cure or substitute the non-
conforming tender, the buyer may reject the tender or revoke
acceptance, cancel the contract and recover damages.
An aggrieved seller, under the UCC, may in appropriate
cases, withhold delivery of goods,33 stop the goods in
transit,34 identify the goods to the contract35 and resell
them with recovery of damages,36 recover damages for non-
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acceptance of a proper tender or have the price paid3? and
cancel the contract.38
The seller's damages include the difference between
the higher contract price and lower resale price39 which may
be even at a scrap or salvage value,40 the difference
between the lower market price and the higher contract price
in case of non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer,41 the
expected profit that would have resulted from the full
performance of the buyer,42 and incidental expenses wherever
appropriate. 43
There is no provision in the UCC whereby a seller can
compel the buyer to perform by accepting a proper tender.
However, there is a possibility of securing buyer's
performance in terms of paYment of price.44 This remedy is
available only in a very limited number of cases as
discussed later.45
The remedies described above do conform to the stated
UCC principle of putting the aggrieved party in a position
where he would have been had the other party performed. This
is a workable principle for protecting the expectation and
reliance interests in a market-economy like the United
States, where both procurement of substitute goods ("cover")
and disposal of excess goods '(resale) are feasible. Without
this precondition, however, the effectiveness of this remedy
in respect of the goal of protection of these interests is
hardly possible. The fOllowing section deals with a
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situation where damages are inadequate and unacceptable as
the primary remedy for breach. This concerns the trade among
a group of non-market economies - the CMEA.
2. THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CMEA
As mentioned earlier, the General Conditions of the
CMEA have been subject to revision in 1968, 1975 and 1979.
It is possible that the provisions most affected by these
revisions are ·those concerning the remedies. 46 The changes
brought about by the revisions have been attributed to the
changes in the economic circumstances of the Member
Countries of the CMEA, which in turn demanded that the
General Conditions "guarantee the further development of the
system of remedies, the reinforcement of contractual
discipline, the precise performance of contractual
undertakings and the indemnification of the party sUffering
a loss to non-performance.,,47
The role of damages in the remedial provisions of the
General Conditions is insignificant compared to that of
specific performance. However, the changes mentioned above
have a distinct bearing on the status of damages under the
General Conditions.
Except for breaches of a contract for a time,48
damages were available only in a limited number of occasions
under the 1958 version of the General Conditions. These were
the breaches Whereby the buyer. changed the data previously
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furnished in connection with production resulting "in
substantial difficulties for the seller,,49 or when the
seller does not comply with the buyer's shipping
instructions.50 The first revision of the General Conditions
added to this the possibility of recovering damages for
actual losses when bilateral agreements between· the
governments of the parties' countries included such a
provision. 51
The place of damages was sUbstantially elevated by the
1975 and 1979 versions of the General Conditions. While the
former established damages as a basic remedy and dealt with
it in a relatively detailed manner,52 the latter recognized
damages as one of the two "forms of substantive
liability. ,,53
The General Conditions now allow recovery of damages
for which penalty has not been provided as a remedy,54 for
breach of contract for a time,55 for non-compliance of
notice requirements,56 and non-delivery,57 the last being an
important addition to the list in the 1979 version.58
The progressive enhancement of the role of damages do
indicate the possibility of widening of the grounds for its
recovery in course of further development of the General
Conditions.59 However, evidently at this stage, the damages
continue to play by far a lesser role as compared that of
damages under the UCC. The General Conditions treat damages
even more sparingly than do the individual Socialist
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countries where the principle that "the party in breach must
pay full compensation consisting of damnum emergens and
lucrum cessans (positive interest).,,60 However, it should be
noted that specific performance, and not damages, remain the
main remedy in the Socialist countries.61 The General
Conditions' limiting the availability of damages have been
attributed to the absence of a convertible currency in the
intra-CMEA trade, which renders damages a relatively
ineffective remedy.62 This is an addition to the argument
that the planned economies under Socialism in general
require fulfillment of contractual obligations as a vehicle
for achieving planned targets, and secondly, in such non-
market economies, compensation does not provide protection
of the expectation and reliance interests. These two
considerations are as applicable for the domestic contracts
as for the international sales contracts of the Socialist
countries. It is therefore doubtful that the availability of
a convertible currency alone would have resulted in a more
prominent role for damages in the system of remedies under
the General Conditions.
3. THE UN SALES CONVENTION
Both the buyer63 and the seller64 under the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods are allowed to recover damages for breach of
contract. However, the Convention clearly prefers specific
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performance to damages as the primary remedy65 and intends
the recovery of damages to accompany the demand for specific
performance. 66
Both the buyer and the seller are referred to the
common provisions for damages67 whereas all other remedies
are separately listed for each of the parties.68 -
Under the Convention, a buyer is entitled to claim
damages for the delay in performance by the seller even when
the former had allowed a reasonable time for performance.69
Likewise, he may also claim damages when the seller
belatedly remedies any failure to perform.70 The buyer is
entitled to cancel the contract when there is a fundamental
breach71 or in other specified situations like non-
performance even after the allowance of a grace period,72
and claim damages.73
The seller is entitled to damages in case of a breach
of the buyer to the same extent as the latter would have
been entitled to had he been the aggrieved party.74 Just
like the aggrieved buyer, the aggrieved seller may also
allow a grace period to the buyer to perform and claim
damages for delay.75 He may also cancel the contract76 under
the identical conditions77 set out for the aggrieved buyer
and claim damages.78
Damages, according to the Convention, are a sum equal
to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by "... (a)
party as a consequence of breach."79 The damages, however,
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"may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foroesaw
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which
he then knew or ought to have known as a possible
consequence of the breach of contract.,,80 The introduction
of limitation in recovering damages may prevent creditors
from claiming unjustifiable amount of damages. Moreover,
both the subjective ("foresaw") and the objective ("ought to
have foreseen") criteria established by this provision are
likely to assist courts in drawing lines between claimed and
recoverable damages.
Among the other Convention provisions concerning
damages, perhaps the most notable is Art. 75 which appears
to consolidate the contents of the UCC provisions on
resale81 and cover.82 However, the aggrieved parties may
recover as damages the difference between the market price
and the contract price without having to resell or cover.83
This provision of the Convention is comparable to the UCC
provisions on the seller's damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation84 and the buyer's damages for the same type of
breach85 which are offered as alternatives to resale86 and
cover.87
Under the Convention, mitigation of damages is a duty
of the aggrieved party.88 Mitigation of damages is an
obligation of the party seeking damages also under the
UCC.89
47
Damages as a remedy occupy a distinctly different
position in the three uniform laws of sales under
discussion.
In case of the UCC, the damages are the generally
available remedy. For every form of breach the aggrieved
party must resort to damages to be compensated for the
actual losses or lost profits. Deviation from this general
regime is allowed only under exceptional circumstances.90
Almost a diametrically opposite attitude towards the
damages is shown by the General Conditions, where firstly,
damages, until the latest revision, played only a marginal
role. Secondly, for commonly occurring breaches like delayed
delivery, insistence on specific performance, accompanied by
penalties,91 remains the only recourse available to the
aggrieved party. The position of the General Conditions can
be explained partly by the legal traditions the Socialist
countries follow, but mostly by the priorities and
limitations of the non-market economic system.92
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods by contrast contain a relatively
elaborate mechanism for claiming and recovering damages for
breach which occasionally resemble some of the key UCC
remedy provisions. However, the fundamental difference
between the provisions of these two instruments is that,
unlike under the UCC, damages are not the primary remedy
under the Convention.9~ They playa supplementary role under
the Convention much like the ones under the General
Conditions do.
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1. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89Yale L.J. 472 (1980).
2. See The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 344 (1979).
see also Von Mehren, A General View of Contracts, VII-1
Int'l. Encycl. Compo L. 85: Of the Civil Law system, the
German Law distinguishes between the expectation interest(positive interest), reliance interest (negative
interest) and restitution interest, whereas the
distinction between these interests are relatively
underdeveloped in the French Law. See Treitel, Remedies
for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a PartyAggrieved) VII-16, Int'l. Encycl. Compo L. 32-33.
3. Worley, Remedies for Breach of Contract in Common Law
Jurisdictions, in Drafting and Enforcing Contracts in
Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions 121, 122 (1986).
This principle is clearly illustrated in the remark of
Holmes: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means
a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are
liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless
the promised event comes to pass, and this is all the
difference." Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev.457, 462 (1897).
4. Robinson v. Harman, 1 Ex. 850, 855 (1848).
5. See Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany,sr-Mich. L. Rev. 495 (1959).
6. See Worley, supra note 3, at 129.
7. The elevation of the role of specific performance by theUniform Commercial Code in the United States isdiscussed in Ch. IV, § B.1. infra.
8. See ~, R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 88 (1977).
9. Id. at 90.
10. The French Civil Code, Art. 1101; articles 1136-41
further consider the agreements to give, i.e., totransfer specific assets.
11. Id., Art. 1101; articles 1142-45 further consider theagreements to do or not to do.
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12. Id., Art.1142 provides: "Every obligation to do or not
to do is resolved in damages in case of non-performanceby the obligor."
13. Id., Articles 1143-44.
14. The German Civil Code, Art. 249.
15. Id., Art. 251.
16.· Id., Articles 250, 283 and· 326.
17. Id., Art. 252.2.
18. Dawson, supra note 5 at 529-530.
19. Id., at 530.
20. See infra Ch. IV, § B.1., on the treatment of specific
performance by the UCC which is illustrative of suchdeviation.
21. C. Schmitthoff, The Sale of Goods 32 (1966).
22. The Uniform Commercial Code (Official Text of 1972 as
ammended up to 1986,hereinafter cited the UCC) § 1-
106(1) (emphasis added); compare the Robinson ruling,
supra note 4 with accompanying text.
23. The UCC, § 2-711(1)(a) and (b); this section, dealing
with the seller's breach in general, makes damages
available to the buyer for non-delivery and repudiation
by the seller and proper rejection and justifiable
revocation by the buyer in addition to cancellation by
him of the contract, recovery of price paid or
procurement of substitute goods.
Exceptions to this rule are provided in sub-sections 2-
711(2)(a) and (b) for cases when the goods have been
identified to the contract or when recovery of the goods
is permissible under the UCC § 2-502 (Buyer's Right to
Goods on Seller's Insolvency) or 2-716 (Buyer's Right toSpecific Performance or Replevin).
24. Id., § 2-712(2).
25. Id., § 2-713(1).
26. Id., § 2-714(1).
27. Id., § 2-714(2).
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28. Id., § 2-715.
29. Id., § 2-717.
30. Id., § 2-508(1); the cure must be effected within the
time for delivery.
31. Id., § 2-508(2); when the seller believed that his
tender would be acceptable with or without money
allowance, he may substitute the goods on rejection by
the buyer within a further reasonable time.
32. Id.
33. Id. , § 2-703(a).
34. Id. , §§ 2-703(b) and 2-705.
35. Id. , § 2-703 (c) .
36. Id. , §§ 2-703(d) and 2-706.
37. Id. , §§ 2-703(e) and 2-709.
38. Id. , § 2-703(f).
39. Id. , § 2-706(1).
40. Id. , § 2-704(2).
41. Id. , § 2-708(1).
42. Id. , § 2-708(2).
43. Id. , § 2-710.
44. Id. , § 2-709.
45. See Chapter IV. § B.1. infra.
46. See I. Szasz, The CMEA -Uniform Law for International
Sales 155 (1985) ,(hereinafter cited as Szasz).
47. Id.
48. The General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods between
Organizations of Member Countries of CMEA 1968/1975 in
the Wording of 1979 (hereinafter cited as the General
Conditions), § 11-A: An English translation of the text
of the General Conditions is appended to T. Hoya, East-
West Trade: Comecon Law: American Soviet Trade (1984)
(hereinafter cited as Hoya).
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A contract for.a time is one "...containing an express
indication, or from whose contents it clearly follows,
that upon violation of the time of delivery the contract
is automatically rescinded or the buyer has the right
immediately to rescind the contract." This type of
contracts are rarely concluded in the intra-CMEA trade.See T. Hoya, supra, at 212.
49. The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between
Foreign Trade Organizations of the Member-Countries of
CMEA, Art. 9 (English translation appended to Berman,
Unification of Contract Clauses in Trade between Member-
Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, 7
Int'l & Compo L. Q. 659 (1958).
50. Id., Art. 29.
51. The General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods between
Organizations of Member-Countries of the CMEA, 1968,
§§ 31(7) and 75(6) (English translation appearing
in Hoya & Quigley, Jr., Comecon 1968 General Conditions
for the Delivery of Goods, 31 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1970).
52. See Hoya, supra note 48, at 213-214.
53. The General Conditions, supra note 48, § 67-A(2)
states in part:" The forms-of substantive liability are:
.••b) compensation by the debtor to the creditor ofdamages. II
54. Id., § 67-c(2)i § 67-c(1) deals with the situations
where only the penalty is applicable.
55. Id. , §§ 77(1) and 86(2).
56. Id. , §§ 69(3) and 87(2).
57. Id. , § 85(4).
58. See Hoya, supra note 48, at 215.
59. Id. , at 214.
60. Eorsi, Contractual Remedies in Socialist Legal Systems,
VII-16 Int'l Encycl. Compo L. 153, 173.
61. Id., at 153.
62. Id.
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63. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 1980 (hereinafter the
Convention). UN-certified English Text appears in 52
Fed. Reg. 40, 6264 (1987), Art. 45(1)(b).
64. Id., Art. 61 (1) (b) .
65. See infra Chapter IV, § A.3.
66. The Convention, supra note 55, Article 45(2) states;
"The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to
claim damages by exercising his right to other
remedies." See also infra note 68-69 with accompanyingtext.
67. The Convention, supra note 63, Articles 74-77 (damages).
68. Id., Articles 45-52 and 61-65 deal with remedies for the
buyer and the seller respectively.
69. Id., Art. 47.
70. Id., Art. 48(1).
71. Id., Art. 49(1)(a): Id., Art. 25 defines fundamental
breach as one which "results in such detriment to the
other party as substantially to deprive him of what he
is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person
of the same kind in the same circumstances would not
have foreseen such a result."
72. Id., Art. 49(1)(b).
73. Id., Articles 45(1)(b), 45(2), 74-76.
74. Id., Articles 61(1)(b) and 61(2) which are identical to
articles 45(1)(b) and 45(2) respectively, the latter
pair establishing the aggrieved buyer's right to damages.
75. Id., Art. 63 is identical to Art. 47 concerning the
buyer's remedy. See supra note 69 with accompanying text.
76. Id., Art. 64.
77. See supra note 71-72 with accompanying text.
78. The Convention, supra note 63, Articles 61(1)(b), 61(2)
and 74-76.
79. Id., Art. 74.
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90. See Ch. IV, § B.1. infra.
83. The Convention, supra note 63, Art. 76.
84. The UCC, supra note 22, § 2-708.
85. Id. , § 2-713.
86. Id. , § 2-708, comment 2.
87. Id. , § 2-713, comment 5.
88. The Convention, supra note 63, Art.77.
80. Id.: This prOV1S10n is comparable to the
foreseeability test established by the rUling in Hadley
v. Baxendale [156 E. R. 145 (Ex. 1854)].
81. The UCC, supra note 22, § 2-706.
82. Id., § 2-712; The Convention, supra note 63, Art. 75
states: "If the contract is avoided and if, in a
reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after
avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement, or
the seller has sold goods, the party claiming damages
may recover the difference between the contract price
and the price in the substitute transaction, as well as
any further damages recoverable under article 74."
89. ~, the UCC, supra note 22, § 2-715(2). Comment 2 to
this section provides that the section modifies the
"prior uniform statutory provision as to consequential
damages resulting from breach of warrantY ...by
requiring first that the buyer attempt to minimize his
damages in good faith, either by cover or otherwise."
91. The role of penalties in the General Conditions is
discussed in Ch. V,§ A infra.
92. This proposition is discussed more elaborately inChapter IV infra.
93. See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales
under the 1980 United Nations Convention 221 (1982).
CHAPTER IV
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAWS
The major difference between the remedy provisions of
the Civil and Common Law systems is that the former places
more emphasis on specific performance as a generally
available remedy rather than on damages.1 The advantages of
specific performance are that this remedy avoids the
difficult task of measuring damages and it comes as close as
feasible to giving an aggrieved party what he bargained for,
leaving the possibility of supplementing this remedy by
damages.2 Moreover, this remedy prevents the obligor from
being burdened disproportionately to the reward he bargained
for while the obligee is prevented from receiving a windfall
gain.3
The Civil Law preference for specific performance is
thought to have originated from the Roman Law. The Roman
Law, however, like the English Law, practiced what it
relegated to a secondary position later. The classical Roman
Law was familiar with only money-judgement. 4 Specific
performance did not have itself accepted as the primary
remedy even under the medieval Roman Law.5 It is only
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towards the middle of the 14th century that specific
performance became well-rooted in the Roman Law as the
primary remedy.6 Since that time to the present day,
specific performance has played the dominant role in the
system of remedies of the Civil Law system.7
In the Common Law system, the role of specific
performance has been completely different from the one it
plays in the Civil Law system. This is because "traditional
goal of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the
promisor to perform his promise, but compensation of the
promisee for the loss resulting from breach."B Damages were
found to be adequate for aChieving this goal. Therefore, the
Common Law will not endorse specific performance so long as
"damages would be "adequate to protect the expectation
interest of the injured party.,,9 The remedy of specific
performance remains an exceptional one, available only
through the court's discretion.10
The limitation on availability of specific performance
in the Common Law through the sUfficiency of damages11 is
not exhaustive. Specific performance will not be granted in
case of uncertain terms of contract on which the remedy
would have to be based.12 The remedy may also be refused "if
a substantial part of the agreed exchange for the
performance to be compelled is unperformed and its
performance is not secured to the satisfaction of the
court."13 Furthermore, specific performance will not be
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decreed if it will result in unfairness because of the
contract's having been induced by mistake,14 or the
unreasonable hardship or loss to the obligor or a third
person,15 or when the exchange is grossly inadequate or
other terms of the contract unfair.16 However, specific
performance, otherwise available, will not be denied in
spite of the terms of the· agreement if its denial will cause
unreasonable hardship or loss to the aggrieved party.17
Specific performance will be denied also when such a
performance is deemed difficult to be supervised or when in
the cost-benefit analysis, such a supervision of the
performance is found disadvantageous.18
The disparity in treatment of specific performance in
·the two legal systems, however, is not as much in practice
as in theory. This is because in the Civil Law jurisdictions
an aggrieved party will prefer not
"to bring a claim for specific performance,
waiting to obtain a jUdgement and then attempting
to levy execution. This would be much too
expensive in terms of time, effort and money •.
Rather, an aggrieved party will procure a
substitute performance and then claim damages. In
practice, he thus will act like his brother in
England or. in the United States.,,19
On the other hand, the restrictions on the
availability of specific performance lost some of their
severity in the Common Law jurisdictions, particularly in
the United States, where the Uniform Commercial Code
provides for a broader application of the remedy then in
Common Law.20
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B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNIFORM LAWS
1. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code is thought to have
expanded the availability of specific performance in the
United States.21 Indeed, the UCC § 2-716, besides
authorizing replevin, allows a decree of specific
performance not only where the goods are "unique", but also
in "other proper circumstances".22 The drafters of the UCC
expressly wished this provision to "further a more liberal
attitude than some courts have shown in connection with
specific performance of contracts of sale.,,23
The scope of the "other proper circumstances" which
warrant specific performance under the UCC was perceived by
the Code's drafters to be broad. The inability of an
aggrieved buyer to cover, in the opinion of the drafters, is
a "strong evidence of other proper circumstances.,,24 This
apparently indicates the actual or potential broadening of
the sphere of application of specific performance.25
Apart from the UCC § 2-716, there is another provision
which gives the result of specific performance when the
breach becomes evident due to the insolvency of the seller.
In this case, the UCC § 2-502 gives the aggrieved party the
right to recover goods identified to the contract within ten
days after the seller has received the first instalment of
the price and became insolvent.26 The first limitation to
this remedy is clear. The ten-day period is a short time for
i._ ~
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the goods to be identified when they have not been
identified to the contract earlier. If a buyer advances
money for the manufacture of goods, the identification is
most likely to occur too late for the buyer to benefit from
the provision of § 2-502.27 The buyer's right under this
provision is also likely to be limited by the possibility
that such rights will be subordinated to the rights of
trustees or other creditors in case of bankruptcy of the
seller.28
Finally, specific performance by the buyer in terms of
payment of the contract price can also be secured under the
UCC.29 This remedy, however, is limited to cases where
resale is impracticable except when the buyer has either
accepted the goods or the goods are destroyed after the risk
of loss has passed to him.30
The history of the application of the specific
performance provisions of the UCC, therefore, points to a
two-way tendency. While there is no doubt that the drafters
of the UCC sought to expand the availability of the remedy,
there has not been a complete turn-about from the Common-
law reluctance towards enforcing specific performance either
because the courts have not met the expectations of the UCC
drafters, or that the limitations on the availability of the
remedy31 are too stringent to allow a wider access to it.
This is probably best explained by the fact that the
drafters of the UCC did not intend to bring about a
, .
c
~
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revolutionary change in favor of specific performance.32
Rather, they intended to initiate" an evolutionary
liberalization of specific performance in Llewellyn's 'grand
style' of the common law .•. (which) favors a case by case
development attuned to modern business needs which change as
those needs change.,,33
2. THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CMEA
In the context of the role of remedies for breach of
contract in the intra-CMEA trade, an important
distinguishing feature of the CMEA needs to be noted in the
very beginning. The "main goal of economic integration (in
the Socialist system) is not so much the creation of a
common market,34 but rather the coordination of national
planning. ,,35Hence, most cont-racts are concluded between the
foreign trade organizations of the CMEA Member Countries on
the basis of agreements between States, which in turn are
the results of such States' endeavour to conduct external
(as opposed to domestic) economic activities which are in
harmony with their national economic plans. This serves as a
ground for the demand of "real performance" of contracts. As
in the case of domestic contracts, in the event of a breach
of contract in the intra-CMEA trade, both the aggrieved
party and the party in breach would "deviate from their
planned tasks if one does not perform and the other does not
insist on performance.,,36 The second reason for the
economy" attributed to a Socialist State. There is no market
where he can procure substitute goods and claim damages nor
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The diametrically opposite stand of this position to
insistence on specific performance of contracts in the
Socialist system is explained by the very term "non-market
for facilitating either cover or resale in a Socialist
can an aggrieved seller dispose of his goods in a resale.
"The fundamental principle on which the
contractual relations of the enterprises of the
socialist countries rely is that of 'real
performance' (specific performance). This willsay the purpose of a contract is the
satisfaction of real, i.e., genuine needs:
buyer's interest is attached to the delivery of
goods specified by the contract. Notwithstanding
any disturbance interfering with performance,
the parties have to adhere to real, actual
performance, for which no substitute, no
'ersatz' such as cash or damages will do.,,3?
Under the General Conditions, a buyer is entitled to a
economy. An aggrieved buyer does not have a market from
The fOllowing remark of a Socialist jurist clarifies further
the significance of specific performance for the CMEA:
that of the Common Law on specific performance is evident.
Therefore, it follows that, under the General Conditions,
specific performance is the basic remedy for breach _
damages being an exception.
penalty from the seller for the latter's delay in
delivery.38 A delay in delivery of technical documents
without which the capital items delivered are inoperable
also entails paYment of a penalty by the seller in the same
manner as in the case of delayed delivery of goods.39
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The same procedure is to be followed where the two delays
occur in the reverse order, i.e., the delay in the delivery
of goods is followed by a delay in the presentation of
technical docurnents.40 A penalty is levied also in case of a
delay in presentation by the seller of a certificate of
analysis of goods intended for processing without which the
goods cannot be used.41 A seller may seek exemption from the
paYment of penalty on grounds that relieve him from
obligation in case of a delay in delivery, although he
remains bound by the contractual obligations even if he is
wholly or partially exempted from the paYment of penalty.42
The buyer is allowed to rescind the contract when the
delay in question exceeds 4 to 6 months depending on the
nature of goods.43 The buyer is not required to wait for
this period if the seller informs him of his inability to
deliver within this time.44
In case of delivery of complete plants and
installations, the parties are required to stipulate times
for renunciation in each individual case.45
The General Conditions do not require a buyer to prove
his cessation of interest to renounce the contract once the
mandatory waiting period expires.46 On the other hand,
cessation of interest does not authorize renunciation by the
buyer before the expiry of the waiting period.47 This is a
deviating position from that of the national laws of the
CMEA Member Countries.48
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On renunciation of the contract, the buyer may either
accept a 8% penalty for a delay, or bring in a claim for
damages which will be at least 4% of the value of the goods
unless a higher loss is proven.49
In case of a short-delivery, the buyer may either
demand the delivery of the missing quantity or return of the
amount paid for it.50
In case of a delivery of defective goods, the buyer
may either demand remedy of the defects, or a corresponding
reduction in price.51 When the defective goods cannot be
used for their designated purpose without repair, and the
buyer opts to demand repair from the seller, the former is
entitled to make a claim for penalty in accordance with the
schedule52 with the date of claim as the starting point and
the date of completion as the limit for the purpose of
calculation of the penalty.53 The General Conditions do not
authorize a rescission of the contract for delivery of
defective goods,54 unless otherwise provided in a bilateral
agreement or contract.55
The seller may receive a penalty equivalent to 2% of
the returned goods if the buyer refuses to accept.56 The
possibility of the breach of non-payment of the price by the
buyer is practically ruled out in the intra-CMEA trade where
the general mode of payment is cash against documents.57 In
case when the payment is made through a letter of credit,
the buyer must pay a penalty of 0.05% of the value of the
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letter of credit for each day of delay in its opening.58 The
seller may rescind the contract if the buyer fails to open
the letter of credit within an additional time which he is
obliged to allow.59
Therefore, the remedy provisions of the General
Conditions, although not explicitly mentioning specific
performance, establish a regime whereby the parties are
obligated to perform, which can be supplemented by paYment
of penalties for delays, or repair/replacement of goods as
well as non-paYment for the corresponding part of short-
delivered goods etc. Only under extremely rare circumstances
are the parties allowed to claim damages, terminate the
contract or be exempted from performance.60
3. THE UN SALES CONVENTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods expressly places specific
performance at the head of the list of available remedies
for breach of contract.61 Article 46(1) of the Convention,
dealing with the buyer's remedies, states in clear terms
that "(t)he buyer may require performance by the seller of
his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy
which is inconsistent with this requirement.,,62 The
preference of the Convention of specific performance is put
in more concrete terms in the sub-sections following this63
which provide that where the goods do not conform and such a
r
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non-conformity constitutes a fundamental breach, the buyer
may either require delivery of substitute goods, may effect
the repair himself, or require the seller to repair unless
other circumstances make this demand unreasonable.
As for the seller's remedies, the Convention is also
clear in its preference of specific performance. Art. 6264
of the Convention authorizes the seller to require from the
buyer the paYment of the price, acceptance of delivery and
performance of other obligations.
That the Convention and the Common law provisions on
remedies run counter to each other in terms of preference
for one or the other remedy is evident. Even with the
attempt by the Uniform Commercial Code at liberalizing the
courts' attitude towards specific performance falls far
short of the Convention's success in having specific
performance established as a generally available remedy in
international trade under it.
The adoption by the drafters of the Convention of
provisions establishing specific performance as the primary
remedy can be explained, ironically not by the advantages on
grounds of its merit, but simply by the fact that the Civil
Law and Socialist jurisdictions prevailed over others in
assigning specific performance a dominant role in the system
of remedies under the Convention.65 This is not to say that
the drafters were motivated by selfish or nationalistic
considerations. It is not unnatural, concedes a participant
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of the drafting process, for the drafters to "assume what.is
familiar is probably better than what is new and strange.,,66
Furthermore, there is the practical consideration that "(i)n
international trade the law of one's own country gives those
familiar with that law substantial 'know how' advantages.,,67
However, the Convention attempts to mitigate the
burden on the Common Law jurisdictions regarding the
enforcement of specific performance through its Article 2868
which provides that "(i)f, in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention, one party is entitled to require
performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is
not bound to enter a specific performance unless the court
would do so under its own law in respect of similar
contracts of sale not governed by this Convention."
This compromise position, however, has been subjected
to criticism, understandably from the supporters of specific
performance first and foremost.69 It did not ensure the
full satisfaction of the representatives of the Common Law
jurisdictions either.70 The fact remains, however, that the
divergent trends of Art. 28 vis-a-vis the remedy clauses may
encourage forum shopping by the parties. On the other hand,
the parties who intend to avoid the Convention's provisions
which are unfavorable to them or unsuitable to their
business, are anyway free to do so under the authority of
Art. 6, which provides that" (t)he parties may exclude the
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application of this Convention, or subject to article 12,71
derogate or vary from the effect of any of its provisions."
Specific performance, the preferred remedy under the
Civil Law and Socialist jurisdictions, has also been
accepted as the preferred remedy under the Convention.
However, the Convention is not as rigid as the General
Conditions of the CMEA in requiring specific performance.
Firstly, there are more allowances for claiming of damages
under the Convention than there are under the General
Conditions. Secondly, in trying to accommodate the major
legal systems' traditions, the Convention left a possibility
for the Common Law jurisdictions to continue denying
specific performance in a case tried under the provisions of
the Convention. This makes the Convention a relatively
weaker uniform law compared to the General Conditions.
However, the closeness of the legal and economic systems of
the Member Countries of the CMEA is a significant element
contributing to the uniformity and consistency in the
provisions of the General Conditions, which is not the case
with the Convention. Therefore, the Convention, representing
a much broader spectrum of social and legal systems, cannot
be expected to establish the kind of uniformity that the
General Conditions have been successful in bringing about.
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VII-16 Int'l. Encycl. Compo L. 15.
36. Drobnig, supra note 19, at 320-321.
37. I. Szasz, the CMEA Uniform Law for International Sales
167 (1985), (hereinafter cited as Szasz).
38. The General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods between
Organizations of Member-Countries of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (GCD CMEA, 1968/75, in the
Wording of 1979), § 83(1); (hereinafter cited as the
General Conditions). An English translation of the text
of the General Conditions is appended to T. Hoya, East-
West Trade: Comecon Law: American-Soviet Trade (1984).
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The rate of the penalty is fixed by § 83(2) as follows:
- for the first 30 days after the due date has
expired ••.0.05% of the value of undelivered goods per
day
- for the next 30 days •..0.08%
- thereafter ...0.12%
The total amount of penalty however, may not exceed 8%
of the value of goods involved. Id., § 83(3).
For a fixed term contract, the penalty is 5% of the
value of undelivered goods, unless otherwise provided
under a bilateral agreement or contract. Id., § 86(1).
39. Id., § 84; if the delay in presentation of the document
occurs after the delay in delivery of the goods
themselves, the former is considered to be a
continuation of the delay for the purpose of calculation
of the penalty.
40. Id.
41. Id. , §§ 84-A(1) and 84-A(2).
42. See, Szasz, supra note 37, at 159.
43. The General Condition, supra note 38, § 85(1).
44. Id. , § 85(2).
45. Id. , § 85(3).
46. See Hoya, supra note 38, at 194.
47. See Szasz, supra note 37, at 160.
48. ~, § 225 of the Civil Code of the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) provides inter alia
that "(i)f the performance is no longer of interest to
the creditor because of delay on the part of the debtor,
the creditor may refuse to accept the performance and
may demand compensation for damages."
49. The General Conditions, supra note 38, § 85(4): The
right to damages, however, remains restricted to
attributable delay, see Szasz, supra note 37, at 160.
50. Id., § 75(1).
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51. Id., § 75(2); if the aggrieved buyer demands repair of
defective goods, the seller is to effect the repair
immediately at his own expense, or replace the
defective goods. Id., § 75(3).
52. Id., § 83(2), see supra note 38.
53. Id., § 75(4).
54. This is another case of departure from the national laws
of the CMEA Member Countries. The Civil Code of RSFSR,
supra note 46, § 246 ~, provides that in case of a
delivery of defective goods, ".•.the buyer may, at his
election, demand either substitution of a proper
article ••.for the article of improper quality; or a
proportionate decrease in the purchase price; or
removal of the defects •.•or rescission of the contract
with compensation to the buyer for the damages ..."
55. The General Conditions, supra note 38, § 75(4).
56. Id., § 86-A; this sub-section refers to the goods in
respect of which the buyer has presented a claim. He is
not allowed to return the goods without the seller's
consent, except in the case of a continued shipment by
the seller despite repeated protests. Id., § 78(2).
57. See Szasz, supra note 37, ·at 178.
58. The General Conditions, supra note 38, § 67(1).
59. Id., § 67(3).
60. Id., §§ 68(1) and 68(2): The grounds for exemption are
partial or complete non-performance due to circumstances
of insuperable force, i.e., "circumstances which arose
after the conclusion of the contract as results of
events of an extraordinary character, unforeseen and
unavoidable by a party."
The Parties are also relieved of their liability if the
non-performance occurred following a : "bilateral
agreement, or from the contract or from the substantive
law of the seller's country applicable to a given
contract." Id., § 68(3).
61. See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales
under the 1980 United Nations Convention 296 (1982).
62. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 1980, UN-ce~tified English
text appearing in 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6264 (March 2, 1987),
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Art. 46(~); (hereinafter cited as the Convention).
63. Id., Articles 46(2) and 46(3).
64. Id., Art. 62 states: "The seller may require the buyer
to pay the price, take delivery or perform his other
obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a remedy
which is inconsistent with this remedy."
65. See Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 Am. J.
Compo L. 247, 249 (1979).
66. EOrsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of
Contracts for International Sale of Goods, 27 Am. J.
Compo L. 311, 315 (1979); Mr. EOrsi (Hungary) was
closely connected with the drafting of the Convention
and was elected the President of the Diplomatic
Conference that adopted the Convention in 1980. See UN
Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 of April 10, 1980.
67. Eorsi, Id.
68. The Convention, supra note 62, Art. 28.
69. See, ~, EOrsi, A Propos The 1980 Vienna Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31 Am. J.
Compo L. 333, 347 (1983): EOrsi views the inclusion of
Art. 28 as detrimental to un~fication.
70. See Farnsworth, supra note 65, at 249: Professor
Farnsworth expresses his surprise that "it has not been
possible to work out a compromise that would be
satisfactory to countries with other legal traditions
and different economies (than that of the Civil law and
Socialist countries).
71. The Convention, supra note 62, Art. 12 concerns the
statute of fraud, and as such does not concern the
subject under discussion.
CHAPTER V
OTHER REMEDIAL PROVISIONS IN THE UNIFORM LAWS
A. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTY
Motivated either by the inconvenience and difficulty
in proving a loss, or apprehending improbability of
obtaining an adequate remedy in case of a breach and to
limit liability to a known quantified figure, the parties to
a contract may choose to include therein a provision
stipulating the paYment of a fixed sum of money in case of a
default. Such stipulations, when valid under the law, are
termed as clauses for "liquidated damages" in the Common
Law. Identical stipulations, but void under law, are known
as "penalties".l
In agreement with the compensatory principle of the
Common Law, stipulation for the paYment of a fixed sum of
money by the debtor in case of a breach is enforceable but
only if the amount thus stipulated reflects a just
compensation, not an inducement to perform or punishment for
non-performance.2 However, the task of distinguishing a
compensatory clause from a punitive one is not an easy one.3
The Uniform Commercial Code4 provides the following
guidelines for valid liquidated damages:
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1) The damages must be a reasonable amount in the
light of anticipated or actual harm,
2) the loss must be difficult to prove, and
3) the possibility of obtaining an adequate remedy
otherwise must be inconvenient or unfeasible.
An unreasonably large amount of damages is a suspect
as penalty, and therefore, void under the Ucc.5 An
unreasonably small sum may also lead to the stipulation
being declared as unconscionable, hence void.6
While the emphasis on the reasonableness of the agreed
sum is quite pronounced in the UCC, the difficulty or
impossibility of proving losses does not appear to be an
essential element. While the former alone can lead to the
clause declared void, the latter itself does not always
constitute a sufficient basis for such a declaration.7
Moreover, since the possibility of proving damages would
proportionately decrease the necessity for stipulating
liquidated damages, this requirement is somewhat
superfluous. The same rationale may be applied to the third
requirement, i.e, the inconvenience or unfeasibility of
obtaining adequate damages. Easier access to adequate
damages would also render such a stipulation unnecessary.
Therefore, it is the reasonableness test that stands
clearly as the key factor in determining whether a
stipulation for liquidated damages is valid in accordance
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with the just compensation principle, or void as a penalty
or safeguard for securing performance.
The UCC allows parties to limit their liabilities
exclusively8 to liquidated damages if they so wish, and
limit or exclude consequential damages unless this is
unconscionable.9 In the case of consumer goods, for
instance, the limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person is prima facie unconscionable10 but that of a
loss in the sphere of commercial transactions is not.11 The
UCC expressly intends to leave the parties "free to shape
their remedies to their particular requirements,,,12 and give
effect to "reasonable agreements limiting or modifying
remedies. ,,13
Under the General Conditions of the CMEA,14 the fixed
paYment by the parties have two prominent characteristics
that distinguish them from the category of liquidated
damages as understood in the Common law or the UCC. Firstly,
the fixed-payment is generally set not by the parties but by
the General Conditions.15 The party in default is required
to pay a set percentage of the value of goods involved in
breach of late delivery of goods, technical documents
without which the goods cannot be used for their designated
purpose, or certificate of analysis for goods intended for
processing, if agreed upon furnishing of the same by the
seller,16 or delivery of qualitatively non-conforming and
unusable goods, 17 and for the period the buyer rightfully
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abstains from taking repeated deliveries of non-conforming
goods.18 A set percentage of the sum involved either in a
delayed opening of letter of credit19 or Wrongful demand of
return of the paid amount20 is also payable as a penalty by
the party in default. The upper limit of the penalty of the
first category is 8%21 of the value of goods involved,
whereas that of the second category is 5%22. These set
amounts obviously do not reflect either a just compensation
or the appreciation of the difficulty of proving losses.
They are, in marked contrast to the liquidated damages under
the UCC or the Common Law, mechanisms for eXhorting
performance and discouraging cancellation of the contract.
Penalty for all the above breaches are exclusive; the
aggrieved party is not entitled to claim damages in these
cases.23 The General Conditions also contain provisions for
penalty in case of the buyer's returning without the
seller's consent, defective goods in respect of which he has
brought a claim24 and in case of failure of the seller to
notify or delayed notification by him of shipment of
goods. 25
Penalties have been held to be characteristic of
remedial provisions of the Socialist system.26 However, the
concept of penalties are not altogether unfamiliar also in
the Civil Law system.27 This is explained by the fact that
both these systems emphasize on performance of contractual
obligations, rather than payment of damages in case of a
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breach. The penalties serve as important factors in insuring
such performance and avoiding cancellation as long as
possible.
The UN Sales convention28, departing from the remedy
provisions of the General Conditions in this respect, does
not provide for any penalties. 29 This is a major difference
between the remedy provisions of the two instruments30 both
of which prefer specific performance over damages as
remedies. This is one of the rare instances the position of
the Convention on remedies coincides with that of the UCC.
B. GRACE PERIOD
The "grace period", over and above the stipulated time
allowed to a party in minor breaches for performance within
that time is a feature of the German law.31 The UCC contains
a roughly comparable provision whereby the seller is to be
allowed "a further reasonable time" to substitute goods upon
seasonably notifying the buyer of his intention to do so.32
However, this allowance is conditional upon the seller's
having had reasonable grounds to believe that his tender
would be acceptable with or without money damages.33
Although in the Socialist system, the practice of
agreeing upon a new delivery date after the expiry of the
stipulated one is known,34 the General Conditions do not
contain any provision pertaining to the grace period.
However, the mandatory waiting periods for completion of
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delayed performance envisaged in the General Conditions35
appear to pursue the same goal as that of the grace period
in the Civil Law, i.e., inducing performance. On the other
hand, the General Conditions impose a penalty on the
belatedly performing party which makes their relevant
provision different from the grace period.
The Convention has adopted the concept of grace period
to facilitate performance in the events of breaches which
are not fundamental.36 The grace period in the Convention
has a two-fold purpose. First, it allows the breaching party
to perform his obligations even after a delay. On the other
hand, this serves as a first step for the aggrieved party to
cancel a contract37 since once the grace period has expired,
or when the party in breach expresses his inability to
perform within the grace period, the former can cancel the
contract. 38
The Convention does not bar the parties' claim to
damages for delay while the grace period is in effect.39
However, the courts or tribunals adjudicating a dispute may
not grant any grace period to a breaching party when the
aggrieved party resorts to a remedy.40
C. REDUCTION OF PRICE
The reduction of price is one of the self-help
remedies allowed both under the General Conditions41 and the
Convention.42 The former allows reduction of price as an
80
alternative to the demand by an aggrieved buyer for
rectifying the defects of the delivered goods.43 The
reduction of price may include a penalty subject to the
agreement of the parties.44 The Convention allows the buyer
to reduce the price proportionately to the value of the
goods involved at the time of delivery.45 However, unlike
the General Conditions, the Convention does not authorize
reduction as an alternative to the demand for rectifying the
defects. The buyer may not reduce the price if the seller
can replace the goods within the delivery time without
causing the buyer any unreasonable inconvenience or
unreasonable expense.46 Under the same conditions, the
seller may also correct the non-conformity even after the
delivery. 47
The difference between these provisions and the
nearest provision of the Ucc48 is that a reduction in price
is allowed under the latter for any breach, and the price
deducted represents either whole or partial damages of the
buyer.
C. RESCISSION, CANCELLATION, REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE AND
AVOIDANCE
The term rescission has been used by the Common Law
courts at different times to mean different things.49 On
various different occasions, the term was used in the sense
of rejection and revocation of acceptance as understood by .
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the UCC,50 or the act of the buyer's returning the goods, or
the buyer's cancellation of the executory terms of the
contract and his cause for action of fraud.51 The UCC
recognizes the confusion surrounding these terms52 and
introduces different categories to explain the separate
effects of these terms so as to protect a party from
unintentionally losing his rights through "ill-advised use
of such terms as 'cancellation', 'rescission' or the
like.,,53
Under the UCc,54 the parties to a contract may
"terminate" a contract pursuant to a contractual or legal
provision with the effect that all of the remaining
obligations of the parties after termination are nullified,
but the rights arising from prior breach or performance
remain valid.
Distinguishable from "termination" is "cancellation",
which occurs due to a breach committed by anyone of the
parties.55 In case of a cancellation, the party undertaking
the action retains the rights to remedy based on the whole
of the contract, and the balance performance.56 However, if
expressed in sufficiently clear terms, claims of damages for
antecedent breaches may also be discharged upon
cancellation. 57
"Rejection" and "revocation of acceptance" are
identical in their effects. The difference between these two
terms are that the first is an action taken before the
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acceptance has occurred. The UCC states that unlike in the
pre-Code situations, a buyer is not obliged to choose from
rejection or revocation of acceptance as appropriate, and
claim for damages.S8
In the Socialist doctrine, rescission is a "unilateral
declaration, whereby the contract is terminated ab
initio,,,S9 i.e, the contract is treated as if it never
existed.60 Rescission is a final step, resorted to when
specific performance appears unfeasible or inappropriate.61
The "termination by notice" is also a "unilateral
action whereby the contract is voided ex lliill£." 62 The
remaining performance, however, is subject to restoration if
necessary. 63
The General Conditions, which "unequivocally emphasize
the obligations of the parties to perform, are generally
hostile to rescission. Nevertheless, they do authorize
rescission and cancellation under certain circumstances.
In case of a fixed-term contract,64 the buyer is
authorized to rescind the contract, if he so chooses, for a
defective delivery if the goods are not either replaced or
repaired within the due date of delivery.65 He can then
demand a penalty from the seller or require him to pay
compensation for losses, if the latter is not prohibited by
a bilateral agreement or the contract.66 Also in case of a
fixed-term contract, the buyer may rescind the contract for
late delivery and demand penalty or damages.67
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Under the General Conditions, the rights of the buyer
to reject delivery in an installment contract is severely
restricted. A claim in respect of one of the consignments
does not entitle the buyer to reject subsequent
consignments,68 unless the seller repeatedly delivers
defective goods. The buyer is expressly forbidden to return
the goods in respect of which he has lOdged a claim, without
the consent of the seller.69 A violation of this provision
renders the buyer being penalized to the amount of 2% of the
value of returned goods.70 Only upon repeated deliveries by
the seller of defective goods despite the buyer's demand to
suspend delivery will entitle the buyer to a waiver of this
requirement. 71
Rescission of a contract for qualitatively non-
conforming delivery is authorized under the General
Conditions if a bilateral agreement or the contract gives
the buyer a right to cancel but does not specify the
conditions for his exercising this right.72 Such a
cancellation, however, is conditional upon either the
seller's inability to remedy a defect, or the buyer's
inability to use the goods for their designated purpose even
on reduction of the price.
For a delayed delivery, the buyer may cancel the
contract upon expiry of a mandatory waiting period for
performance.73 However, if the seller in writing notifies
his inability to perform during that period, the buyer can
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also cancel the contract before the expiry of such a
period.74 The buyer may then demand the maximum penalty
amount for delay (8% of the value of the goods involved)75
or damages, which is limited to 4% of the value of goods
unless the buyer can prove a higher 10ss.76
The Convention uses the term "avoidance,,77 of contract
which has the effect cancellation. The buyer or seller can
recover the difference between the market price and the
contract price whether or not a substitute purchase or a
resale has been actually made.78 The grounds for avoidance
are a) fundamental breach79 and b) the expiry of the grace
period80 within which the other party has not performed. The·
avoiding party does not have to wait for the expiry of the
grace period if the other expresses his inability to perform
within that time.81 Like the Ucc,82 the Convention
authorizes avoidance in case of breaches other than delay
(for which a grace period is already a reasonable allowance)
only when the aggrieved party avoids the contract within a
reasonable time after the breach has been or ought to have
been discovered by him.83 For breaches other than late
delivery, when a grace period had been granted and which
expired, the provision applicable to the former, i.e,
avoidance fOllowing expiry of the grace period for delivery
will also apply to the latter.84
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1. The Common Law terminology concerning these stipulations
may give rise to confusion, especially in a comparative
study which includes the Civil Law system as one of the
subjects of comparison. The German and French terms for
such stipulations, in principle enforceable by courts,
are vertragsstrafe (contractual penalty) and clause
penale (penal clause). Therefore, the Civil Law penalty
provisions are comparable to those of liquidated damages
in the Common Law and at the same time, those of
penalties. See Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract
(courses of-XCtions Open to the Part Aggrieved), VII-16
Int'l. Encycl. Compo L. 90. See also infra notes 2 and 5,
and 27 with accompanying text on the voidability of
penalties in the Common Law and its use in the Civil Lawrespectively.
2. Damages are not recoverable if they represent a penalty
because the purpose of awarding the contract damages is
to "compensate the injured party", Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §355, comment (a). Moreover, penalty clauses
are also "unenforceable on the ground of public policy".
Id., §356 (1). See also, Id. comment (a). Furthermore,
the liquidated damages are:not to be used as a deterrent
against non-performance. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 555 (1977).
3. See Summers, Liquidated Damages, Remedies for Breach of
Contract 125 (1975). See also Clarkson, Miller, Muris,
Liquidated Damages, Sense or Nonsense, 1978 Wis. L. Rev.351-352.
4. The Uniform Commercial Code (Official Text of 1972 as
amended up to 1986, hereinafter cited as the UCC), § 2-718(1).
5. Id., See also comment 1 to § 2-718.
6. Id.,; the Restatement position on this is identical, seeRestatement, § 356, comment (d).
7. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 559: Most of the
dealing with liquidated damages emphasize on the
reasonable of the damages, sometimes hardly touching upon
the issue of difficulty of proving a loss; ~~, the
opinion in Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Develop.
Corp., 381 N.Y.S. 2d 459, 344 N.E. 2d 391 (1976).
8. The UCC, supra note 4, §§ 2-719(1)(a), (b) and 2-719(2).
9. Id., § 2-719(3).
16. The General Conditions, supra note 14, §§ 83, 84 and 84-A.
17. Id. , § 75.
18. Id. , §§ 80(2) and 80 (3) .
19. Id. , §§ 67(1) and 67(3).
20. Id. , § 58.
21. Id. , § 83(3).
22. Id. , §§ 67(1) and 58.
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10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id., comment 1 to § 2-719.
13. Id.
14. The General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between
Organizations of the Member Countries of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance 1968/75 in the Wording of
1979, (hereinafter cited as the General Conditions),
(English translation of the text appears in T. Hoya,
East-West Trade: Comecon Law: US-USSR trade (1984),(hereinafter cited as Hoya).
15. See supra ch. IV, notes 36-39 with accompanying text.
But the parties also can stipulate penalties themselves.
See I. Szasz, The CMEA Uniform Law for InternationalSales 186 (1985).
23. Id., § 67-C; there are however breaches that can be
remedied by paYment of damages instead of penalty. ~,
when the buyer cancels a contract after protracted
delay, he can either accept the maximum 8% penalty for
delay, or receive damages up to 4% of the value of non-
delivered goods unless he proves a higher damage, id., §
85(4). There are also situations when the aggrievea--
party can demand only damages and no penalty ; ~ Hoya,supra note 14, at 215.
24. See infra notes 60-63 with accompanying text.
25. The General Conditions, supra note 14, § 87(1); the
amount of the penalty is 0.1% of the value of goods, but
not less than 10 rubles or more than 100 rubles pershipment.
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26. See EOrsi, Contractual Remedies in the Socialist Legal
System, VII-16 Int'l. Encycl. Compo L. 180, 183.
See also, C. Schmitthoff, The Sale of Goods 34 (1966).
27. ~, the French Civil Code Art. 1152 and the German
Civil Code Art. 342 both authorize stipulation of
penalty terms, the difference between these provisions
and those of the General Conditions being that the
penalties are set by the parties in the former whereas
the latter sets the penalties as part of the relevantprovisions.
28. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale Of Goods 1980 (UN-certified English
text appears in 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6264 (Spring,1987),
(hereinafter cited as the Convention).
29. Id., Art. 45 (buyer's remedies) and Art. 61 (seller,s
remedies) which serve as indices for the remedies do notcontain any provision for penalty.
30. See Enderlein, Rights and Obligations of the Seller
under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Dubrovnik Lectures:
International Sale of Goods 133, 188 (1986).
31. The concept of "Nachfrist" in the German Law
provides that so long as performance remains possible,
the creditor may give the debtor a notice requiring
performance within a reasonable time, after which he is
free not to accept performance (The German Civil Code,
Article 326). See also Treitel, supra note 1, at 115.
The French Law has a slightly different version of the
same concept under which the courts may authorize such a
an additional time for performance (delai de grace), id.at 118.
32. The UCC, § 2-508(2).
33. Id.
34. See Sadikov, Breach of Contract, USSR Contract Law 74(1982).
35. The General Conditions, supra note 14, § 83(2).
36. The Convention, supra note 28, Articles 49(1)(a) and
47 for the seller's breach and Articles 64(1)(a) and 63for the buyer's breach.
37. Id., Articles 49(1)(b) and 64(1)(b).
38. See infra notes 80-82 with accompanying text.
See also J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales
under the 1980 United Nations Convention 304-305 (1982).
48. The UCC, supra note 4, §2-717: If, however, a contract
provides for repair or replacement by the seller of
defective goods in accordance with § 2-719 (1)(a)and
(b), the buyer is obliged to allow the seller to do sobefore he can reduce· the price.
57. Id., § 2-720, comment; for such an effect, the
cancellation of the contract must accompany an express
declaration that the action taken is "without
reservation of rights" or an equivalent clause.
88
39. The Convention, supra note 28, Articles 47(2) and 63 (2).
40. ~, Articles 45(3) and 61(3).
41. The General Conditions, supra note 14, § 75(2).
42. The Convention, supra note 28, Art. 50.
43. The General Conditions, Supra note 14, § 75(2).
44. The General Conditions, supra note 14, § 75(6).
45. The Convention, supra note 28, Art. 50.
46. Id. , Articles 50 and 37.
47. Id. , Articles 50 and 48 (1)•
49. See White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 295 (1980).
50. The UCC, §§ 2-601 and 2-608.
51. See White & Summers, supra note 49, at 295.
52. See The UCC, supra note 4, § 2-608, comment l.
53. Id. , § 2-720, comment.
54. Id. , § 2-106(3).
55. Id. , § 2-106(4).
56. Id. ; ~ also id., § 2-711(1).
58. Id., § 2-601, comment 1, and §2-608, comment 1.
72. Id., § 75(7); this provision is a recent addition to the
General Conditions, having been included in 1975. See.
Hoya, supra note 14, at 210. A similar provision is--
contained in the General Conditions in respect of
discovery of the defects during a guarantee (warranty)
period; see The General Conditions, supra note 14,
§ 31(8).-
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59. See EOrsi, supra note 26, at 162.
60. However, the General Conditions appear to deviate from
this. The term rescission frequently appear to imply the
same effects that cancellation has under the UCC,
~ supra notes 55-57 with accompanying text. See alsoinfra note 73.
61. See EOrsi, supra note 26, at 162-163.
62. Id., at 162.
63. Id.
64. The fixed-term contracts are those contracts "by virtue
of an express stipulation therein or from the content
thereof it clearly follows that in case of violation of
the time of delivery the contract shall be rescinded
automatically or the buyer shall have the right to
renounce the contract immediately." The General
Conditions, supra note 14, § II-A. The fixed-terms
contracts are concluded in the intra-CMEA trade on
relatively rare occasions; ~ Hoya, supra note 14, at194.
65. The General Conditions, supra note 14, § 77 (1) .
66. Id.
67. Id. , §§ 86(1) and 86(2).
68. Id. , § 80(1).
69. Id. , § 78(1) .
70. Id. , § 86-A.
71. Id. , § 78(2).
73. Id., § 85(1); although the General Conditions use the
term "renounce" instead of "cancel"in this case, the
penaltY/damages provisions listed in notes 75-76 infra
indicate that the effect of the action coincides withthat· of cancellation in general.
79. The Convention, supra note 28, Article 25 defines a
fundamental breach as one which "results in such
detriment to the other party as sUbstantially to deprive
him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract,
unless the other party in breach did not foresee and a
reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result."
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74. Id. , §85(2).
75. ~, § 85(4).
76. Id.
77. The Convention, supra note 28, Articles 49 and 64.
78. Id. , Articles 75 and 76(1).
80. See supra § B.
81. Id., Articles 49(1)(b) and 64(1)(b).
82. The UCC, supra note 4, §§ 2-602(1) and 2-608(2).
83. The Convention, supra note 28, Articles 49(2)(b)(i) and64(2)(b)(i).
84. Id., Articles 49(2)(b)(ii) and 64(2)(b)(ii).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The foregoing enumeration and analysis of the remedial
provisions of the three major uniform laws and the legal
systems concerning the sale of goods amply indicate that the
two major remedies for breach of contract, namely, damages
and the specific performance occupy markedly different
positions in the hierarchy of remedies in the Common Law and
the UCC on one hand, and the Civil Law, the Socialist Law,
the General Conditions and the Convention on the other.
However there are differences in the treatment of these
remedies within these groups themselves.
Damages are the primary remedy both under the Common
Law and the UCC. However, the UCC is more open to specific
performance as a remedy than is the Common Law. At the same
time, although the Civil Law recognizes the primacy of
specific performance, in practice damages are awarded by the
courts in a large number of cases. Therefore, there is a
distinct tendency in these two groups of laws towards the
Closing the of gap in the usage of these remedies. The
Socialist legal system in general puts more restrictions on
sUbstituting specific performance with damages. The General
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Conditions are stricter than anyone of these laws in
enforcing specific performance. Although even the General
Conditions are progressively recognizing the importance of
damages as a viable alternative to specific performance for
remedying certain kinds of breach, it remains by far the
most restrictive of all the legal systems examined as far as
the award of damages is concerned.
The Convention's approach towards these two remedies
is more balanced than that of any of the legal systems or
the uniform laws, although its preference for specific
performance is quite pronounced. Moreover, the Convention
leaves the possibility open for the courts of the Common Law
jurisdictions to deny specific performance unless they would
have granted the same under their own laws.
The accommodative approach of the Convention which
some perceive as its weakness, nevertheless insures a
broader acceptability of the Convention. Since without the
escape clause on the specific performance, the parties
accustomed to the award of damages could derogate from
specific provisions of the Convention or exclude its
applicability altogether, the inclusion of the former is
somewhat superfluous.
Despite the shortcoming mentioned above, however, the
Convention appears to have chosen a cautious but generally
agreeable approach to deal with one of the most difficult
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problems of unification of international sales law -that
concerning the remedies for breach of contract.
As concerns the other uniform laws, there are distinct
signs that the change in the economic strength and
priorities of the Socialist countries have given rise to the
necessity of gradually relaxing the restrictions on the
availability of damages under the General Conditions,
whereas the UCC in the United States urges a more liberal
allowance of specific performance. These factors indicate
that in the future, perhaps not too remote, the
approximation of the remedial provisions of these two
apparently contradicting systems will come about as a result
of the endeavour of these laws to seek more pragmatic and
efficient solutions to the proble~s of international sale of
goods that are endemic to any legal system.
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